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R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, WILLIAM ] 
REAGAN, individually, 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, 
individually, 
Defendants-Respondents. ] 
i Supreme Court 
I No. 870360 
i Priority No. 14b 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT ROLAND WEBB 
Appellant Roland Webb ("Webb") respectfully submits this 
brief in reply to the brief filed on behalf of Respondents R.O.A. 
General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), William Reagan ("Reagan") and Douglas T 
Hall (collectively "Respondents"). 
SUMMARY OF THE CASE 
The principal issue on appeal is Webb's status as a 
shareholder of R.O.A. for purposes of exercising his statutory 
right to inspect the books and records of R.O.A. By written 
agreement dated July 7, 1981, Webb gave R.O.A. an option to 
repurchase all of Webb's 20% stock interest in R.O.A. at a price 
to be determined by independent appraisals. (R. at 34, 62-78, 
203, 274)• By letter dated January 27, 1987, R.O.A. gave notice 
of its exercise of the option. (R. at 43, 78A, 207, 280, 484, 
508). On three subsequent occasions, Webb notified R.O.A. and 
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Reagan, president of R.O.A., that he wished to exercise his right, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b), to examine the books and 
records of R.O.A. to determine its financial condition, to verify 
the accuracy of its books and records, and to determine the 
approximate value of his stock prior to submitting it to an 
independent valuation. (R. at 53, 485). On each of these 
occasions, Webb was refused access to R.O.A.'s books and records. 
Respondents specifically denied Webb access to the books and 
records on the third occasion on the theory that the exercise of 
the option by R.O.A. automatically divested Webb of his status and 
rights as a shareholder, even though no appraisal had been 
performed, no purchase price had been established, no payment for 
the stock had been tendered and no shares had been transferred. 
Webb contends in this appeal that he is entitled to his statutory 
shareholder right of inspection and seeks an order from this Court 
(i) reversing the District Court's Summary Judgment denying said 
right, (ii) requiring R.O.A. to permit such inspection and 




WEBB IS A SHAREHOLDER OF R.O.A. AND HAS A 
STATUTORY RIGHT TO INSPECT THE BOOKS AND 
RECORDS OF R.O.A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b)(1986) unambiguously provides 
that the right to inspect the books and records of a corporation 
is available to "any person who is a shareholder of record.11 The 
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Utah Supreme Court has concluded that statutory inspection rights 
are accorded to "shareholders of record." Goddard v. General 
Reduction & Chemical Co.. 193 P. 1103, 1105 (1920); see also 
Holmes v. Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1012 (1930) ("One who 
regularly is a stockholder of record is presumed to be a bona fide 
stockholder."). It is undisputed in this case that Webb is, and 
has been throughout this litigation a shareholder of record of 
R.O.A. 
Respondents R.O.A. and Reagan have failed in their Response 
Brief to distinguish any of the authorities cited by Webb, all of 
which hold that the mere exercise of an option to purchase a 
shareholder's stock does not deprive the shareholder of his 
shareholder status and statutory right of inspection. The 
authorities cited by Respondents in support of their position are 
clearly distinguishable from the instant case. Moreover, 
Respondents' arduous reliance on general contract principles is 
misplaced because, as demonstrated below, a direct and forthright 
application of general contract law clearly supports Webb's 
position in this appeal. 
A. The cases cited by Webb are indistinguishable from the 
instant case. 
Respondents' argument in this appeal rests entirely on the 
proposition that "once a shareholder enters into a binding 
contract of sale, title to the stock is immediately transferred 
from that stockholder to the purchasing corporation." 
Respondents' Brief at 22. Respondents assert that all of the 
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cases to the contrary cited by Webb are "incontrovertibly 
distinguishable" because they involve "executory contracts," 
whereas R.O.A.'s exercised option to purchase Webb's stock was not 
executory but rather "a binding bilateral contract of sale." 
Respondents' Brief at 24. Respondents, however, reveal the flaw 
in their own argument by stating:. "While several acts, including 
the setting of the purchase price and the delivery of the stock, 
remain to be performed in the future, R.O.A. has irrevocably bound 
itself to purchase plaintiff's stock." Respondents' Brief at 24. 
Respondent's statement embodies the very definition of an 
executory contract, i.e., "a contract that has not as yet been 
fully completed or performed." Black's Law Dictionary 512 (5th 
ed. 1979). 
Despite R.O.A.'s notice of exercise of the option to purchase 
Webb's stock, R.O.A.'s payment of the purchase price and Webb's 
transfer of the stock are concurrent conditions, neither of which 
has been performed. By definition, the agreement, although 
binding on both parties, remains executory until these conditions 
have been satisfied. The authorities cited by Webb expressly hold 
that until a stockholder has received payment for his shares or 
the shares have been transferred on the books of the corporation— 
in other words, as long as the contract remains executory—the 
stockholder retains his right to examine the books and records of 
the corporation. See Appellant's Brief, 13-18. 
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B. The cases relied upon by Respondents are not on point. 
Respondents' admission that the only cases dealing with 
statutory rights of inspection cited in their brief "may not be on 
all fours with the instant case" is an understatement. See 
Respondents' Brief at 22. Each of the four cases cited by 
Respondents is a conclusory decision from the New York state lower 
court containing little or no factual or legal discussion. Each 
of these cases is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. 
In Dierkina v. Associated Book Service. Inc.. 31 Misc. 2d 
995, 222 N.Y.S.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. I960), for example, the 
court observed that the individual who was denied access to the 
corporation's books and records was the defendant in an action 
'•for specific performance compelling delivery of the certificate 
of stock representing the shares thus sold," implying that the 
stock in question had either been paid for or that the conditions 
for transfer of the stock had otherwise been met. Similarly in 
Nash v. Gav Apparel Corp.. 11 Misc. 2d 768, 175 N.Y.S.2d 938, 939 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958), the court observed that the complaining 
shareholder had sold his stock to the corporation and had already 
delivered the stock to an escrow agent pending final payment of 
the purchase price. Finally, in Rosenberg v. Steinbera-Kass. 
Inc.. 18 Misc. 2d 880, 190 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959), 
the court concluded that the shareholder's rights had been 
terminated since "the purchase price of the stock was paid in 
full," and the shareholder had acknowledged in writing that he had 
delivered his stock certificates to the corporation. 
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Respondents place particular emphasis on the decision in In 
re Gaines. 4 Misc. 2d 935, 180 N.Y.S. 191 (1919), aff d 190 App. 
Div. 941, 179 N.Y.S. 922 (1920), which they erroneously claim was 
based on facts similar to those in the instant case. In contrast 
to the instant case, the individual who was denied the right of 
inspection in Gaines, had already endorsed the stock certificates 
and delivered them to an escrow agent to whom payment for the 
shares had also been tendered by the company. The Gaines court 
concluded that "the action of petitioner in indorsing the stock in 
blank and delivering the same to the Banker'& Trust Company in 
itself divested petitioner of title." Id. at 192 (emphasis 
added)• 
The instant case is controlled by the cases cited by Webb in 
his original brief, each of which is squarely on point. Webb's 
shares have never been appraised, paid for, endorsed or 
transferred on the corporate records as required to complete the 
transfer of title. Consistent with each of the cases cited by 
Webb in his original brief, Webb retains his shareholder status 
and right to examine R.O.A.'s books and records pending 
satisfaction of those conditions. In fact, the courts have 
stressed that a shareholder's right to inspect the corporation's 
books and records is particularly important upon execution of a 
contract to sell his shares since the shareholder is entitled to 
verify the adequacy of the price paid for his shares. Estate of 
Bishop v. Antilles Enterprises. Inc.. 252 F.2d 498, 499 (3rd Cir. 
1958)(until the shares are paid for, the shareholder "has a very 
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real interest in securing accurate information as to the state of 
the • . . corporation's accounts.") 
C. General contract principles are not controlling in this 
case. 
Respondents' argument that the exercise of an option to 
purchase stock creates a valid and binding bilateral obligation on 
the part of both parties merely recites general hornbook law and 
Webb has never argued otherwise. Respondents fail to acknowledge, 
however, that a bilateral contract remains executory until each 
party has performed its obligations thereunder. The obvious fact 
that the R.O.A./Webb option agreement is a bilateral contract does 
not support the conclusion Respondents draw therefrom that M[u]pon 
exercise of the option, title passes" and Webb "ceased to be a 
shareholder in R.O.A." on the date the notice of exercise was 
given. See Respondent's Brief at 10-11. 
Respondents' contention that "payment is irrelevant" to the 
issue of Webb's shareholder status (Respondents' Brief at 13) is 
not supported by the authority Respondents cite in their brief. 
Respondents quote Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations 
§ 5628 for the proposition that "passing of title is not 
predicated upon payment of the purchase price." Respondents' 
Brief at 13. A footnote reference to the language quoted by 
Respondents, however, explains that full payment of the purchase 
price under an installment note is not necessary to the passing of 
title. 12A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 5628 n.14 rev. perm. ed. 
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1984)(referring reader to § 5613). Fletcher further explains at 
§ 5613: 
If the contract indicates that it is the intent of the 
parties that title to the stock and the rights of a 
stockholder shall not pass until some future time, it is 
construed to be an executory contract for the purchase 
and sale of the stock. So if by the terms of the 
contract the buyer is bound to do anything as a 
consideration, either precedent or concurrent, on which 
the passing of the property depends. the property will 
not pass until the condition is fulfilled, even though 
the certificate may be delivered. 
Id. § 5613 (rev. perm. ed. 1984). 
In the instant case, payment for and delivery of the stock 
are clearly concurrent conditions to the passing of title, neither 
of which conditions has been satisfied. The decisions of Tracy v. 
Perkins-Tracv Printing Co.. 278 Minn. 159, 153 N.W.2d 241 (1967) 
and Currey v. Willard Stream Service. 321 P.2d 680 (Okla. 1958), 
cited in Respondents' brief, each involved a stock purchaser's 
failure to make payments under an installment obligation and stand 
solely for the proposition that full payment under an installment 
contract is not required to pass title. 
With respect to Respondents' contention that delivery of the 
actual stock certificate is not necessary to pass title 
(Respondents' Brief at 14), Respondents have acknowledged, to 
their detriment, that this rule applies only when "the purchase 
has been completed." Respondents' Brief at 15 (citing 11 Fletcher 
Cyc. Corp. § 5094 (rev. perm. ed. 1986)(emphasis by respondents)). 
Owvhee. Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo. 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 565 
(1965), and Davies v. Semloh Hotel. 86 Utah 2d 318, 44 P.2d 689 
(1935), cited by Respondents in support of their argument, simply 
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hold that when all necessary conditions to the sale of stock have 
been completed, title and rights to the stock are not necessarily 
determined by possession of the certificates. 
Applying the very standards and reasoning of the cases cited 
by Respondentsf the purchase of Webb's stock has never been 
completed. The option agreement between Webb and R.O.A., by its 
terms, contemplates a consummated sale only after the stock has 
been appraised, payment of the purchase price has been tendered 
and the stock has been endorsed and transferred. 
Tavlor v. Davnes. 118 Utah 2d 72, 218 P.2d 1069 (1950), is 
distinguishable from the instant case because the stock purchase 
contract in that case was "not executory, but [was] a contract of 
a present purchase and sale." Moreover, the stock certificates 
had already been delivered and accepted once. The court observed: 
A contract to sell implies that the title in the goods 
remains vested in the seller and is to be transferred to 
the buyer at some future time. Whether a contract is 
one of sale or an executory contract to sell depends 
always upon what the parties to it intend in regard to 
the time when title in the property is to go to the 
buyer. 
Id. at 1072. Respondents cannot argue in good faith that either 
Webb or R.O.A. intended title to pass immediately upon exercise of 
the option. Both parties knew that an appraisal would have to be 
conducted and that the purchase price would have to be paid before 
title to the shares would pass. It is undisputed that prior to 
Respondents' third refusal to allow Webb to inspect R.O.A.'s books 
and records, R.O.A. recognized Webb as the owner of his shares. 
For example, in March 1987, at least two months after the option 
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was exercised, R.O.A. asked Webb to pledge his stock to First 
Security Bank as collateral for a $10,000,000 loan to R.O.A. See 
Appellant's Brief at 13; R. at 484. 
Respondents further allege that Webb has somehow breached the 
stock option agreement by failing to deliver his shares to R.O.A. 
However, they do not cite any provision of the agreement or any 
facts in the record supporting their claim of breach. See 
Respondents' Brief at 12-13. Respondents' argument based on 
Calderia v. Sokei. 49 Hawaii 314, 417 P.2d 823 (1966), that a 
party to a contract may not use his breach as a basis for an 
action to enforce the contract or as a defense against such an 
action is entirely inapplicable in this case. Not only is the 
record devoid of any facts indicating that Webb breached the 
option agreement, Webb is not seeking to enforce or resist 
enforcement of the option agreement, rather he is seeking to 
enforce his statutory right of inspection. 
POINT II. 
WEBB DID NOT CONTRACT AWAY HIS STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
INSPECT THE BOOKS AND RECORDS OF R.O.A. 
Respondents contend for the first time on appeal that Webb 
somehow waived his rights as a shareholder of record under 
Section 16-10-47(b) by agreeing, in 1981, to submit to an 
independent appraisal to determine the value of his stock if and 
when the stock was ever sold. This argument simply cannot be made 
in good faith in view of Section 16 of the Agreement which states, 
,fThe Stockholders shall retain all their rights as stockholders of 
the Corporation, except those specifically modified by this 
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Agreement." R. at 75. The Agreement contains no specific waiver 
by Webb of his statutory right of inspection. In fact, 
Respondents' argument is inconsistent with the position R.O.A. 
took in 1985 when it permitted Webb to conduct a shareholder 
inspection. The broad inspection rights granted by the Utah 
Legislature do not "serve the same purpose" as appraisal rights. 
See Respondents' Brief at 23. 
POINT III. 
WEBB'S DEMANDS FOR INSPECTION WERE FOR A 
PROPER PURPOSE. 
Once a shareholder has alleged a proper purpose, it is the 
duty of the corporation to put forth specific facts demonstrating 
an improper purpose. Goddard v. General Reduction & Chemical Co., 
57 Utah 180, 193 P. 1103, 1107 (1920). This burden is not 
satisfied by general accusations of harassment and vexation. In 
Holmes v. Bishop, the Utah Supreme Court summarized: 
In the answer it also was alleged that the plaintiff 
sought the inspection "For the purpose of harassing and 
annoying the defendants as officers of the said 
Intermountain Mortuary Company and to hinder them in the 
performance of their duties as such and to bring them 
and the said company into disrepute with the 
stockholders of said company and with the public." All 
that is a mere conclusion without any alleged facts to 
support it. 
15 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1014 (1930). "It is the [corporation's] 
burden to show bad faith and improper purpose on the part of the 
[shareholder]." Curkendall v. United Federation of Correction 
Officers, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 935, 483 N.Y.S. 2d 872, 874 (1985). 
Aside from bald accusations of harassment, Respondents have 
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introduced no evidence whatsoever of an improper purpose for 
Webb's examination. 
Respondents' assertion that Webb conducted an inspection of 
the books of R.O.A. more than two years prior to his demand on 
April 20, 1987, is unavailing. See Respondents' Brief at 25. 
There is no requirement in the statute that a shareholder wait 
more than two years between inspections. In fact, the lapse of 
two years since Webb's only prior inspection suggests that Webb is 
not harassing R.O.A. with repeated inspections. In Holmes v. 
Bishop, 75 Utah 419, 285 P. 1011, 1014 (1930), a corporation 
denied a shareholder's right of inspection on February 19, 1929, 
based on the fact that the shareholder had inspected the company's 
books on December 13, 1928, and "on several occasions thereafter." 
The Utah Supreme Court concluded: "That the plaintiff had been 
given the privilege of an inspection in December, 1928, and on 
several occasions thereafter, did not justify the defendants in 
refusing a further inspection in February, 1929." Id. 
Prior access to books and records as a director of R.O.A. is 
also irrelevant in determining whether Webb's present demand was 
for a proper purpose. Neither the statute nor any case law treats 
a director/shareholder differently than other shareholders. 
Respondents' contention that Webb's failure to inspect 
R.O.A.'s records prior to R.O.A.'s exercise of the option 
"suggests strongly that [Webb's] demands are meant solely to vex 
and harass the defendants" is ludicrous. The cases of delay cited 
by Respondents in support of this argument are furthermore 
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inapposite. Both Foss v. Peoples Gas Light and Coal Co., 241 111. 
238, 89 N.E. 351 (1909) and Skouras v. Admiralty Enterprises. 
Inc.. 386 A.2d 674 (Del. Ch. 1978) deal with the equitable defense 
of laches which has never been pleaded by Respondents. In Foss. 
the 1909 Illinois Supreme Court denied inspection to a shareholder 
who had known about mismanagement for almost 48 years but never 
took any action against the company. Id. at 355. Similarly, in 
Skouras, a former director waited nearly ten years after his 
resignation to remedy mismanagement which he had suspected during 
his term as director. Id. at 682. These cases are not applicable 
to the present situation in which Webb seeks to determine the 
present state of R.O.A.'s books and records. 
Respondents' repeated attempts throughout this litigation to 
characterize Webb's statutory right of inspection as duplicative 
of his right to have an independent valuation of his stock 
demonstrates, at the very least, Respondents' misunderstanding of 
one or both of these processes. The sole purpose of the appraisal 
is to value Webb's stock. The purpose of Webb's statutory 
inspection, however, is to determine the accuracy of R.O.A.'s 
books and records and the legitimacy of all corporate transactions 
prior to submitting to, and as a safeguard in assuring the 
fairness and accuracy of, the independent appraisal. Considering 
that a substantial portion of Webb's life's work has been invested 
in his R.O.A. stock, it is certainly reasonable that Webb be able 
to exercise his statutory right to verify that the valuation of 
his stock is based on honest and accurate information. 
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Furthermore, given Respondents' repeated implications in this case 
that Webb's stock is in fact worthless, notwithstanding the fact 
that R.O.A. obtained a $10,000,000 loan from First Security Bank 
secured by Webb's and Reagan's stock, it is certainly a reasonable 
and proper purpose for Webb to review the financial records of 
R.O.A. to determine how the business has been conducted and 
whether the appraisal is based on complete and accurate 
information. Indeed, Respondents' repeated refusals to permit 
inspection lend credence to Webb's suspicions regarding the 
accuracy and integrity of R.O.A.'s records. 
Respondents' contentions that Webb has refused to sign a 
confidentiality agreement and that Webb has previously usurped a 
corporate opportunity (Respondents' Brief at 28) have no factual 
foundation in the record whatsoever. The confidentiality 
agreement referred to by Respondents was presented only to the 
independent appraisers for signature after Webb had already been 
denied access to the books and records as a shareholder. As 
stated by counsel for Respondents in oral argument in the summary 
judgment proceedings below: "We will let them look at the books 
on an appraisal basis that is going to require a secrecy 
agreement.*1 R. at 468 (emphasis added). Webb was never asked to 
sign a confidentiality agreement in connection with his requested 
shareholder examinations. There are no facts in the record, 
including those parts of the record cited by Respondents, that 
even remotely indicate that Webb usurped a corporate opportunity 
or ever misused information obtained through a prior shareholder 
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inspection. Respondents failed to introduce any evidence 
supporting these claims in the summary judgment proceedings below 
and it is improper for them to raise these arguments in an attempt 
to create a factual dispute on appeal. 
POINT IV. 
WEBB'S REQUESTS FOR INSPECTION WERE FOR A 
REASONABLE TIME. 
The first time Webb sought to inspect R.O.A.'s books and 
records, Webb gave R.O.A. more than a month's written notice and 
requested that the inspection occur during regular business hours 
on the premises of R.O.A. Webb honored R.O.A.'s request that the 
requested examination be postponed until William Reagan, president 
of R.O.A., returned from an overseas trip. The second request was 
also for regular business hours on the premises of R.O.A. The 
second request was denied. In his third request, Webb permitted 
Respondents to choose the time and place and was requested by 
R.O.A. to appear on a specific date at a specific time. Upon 
arriving at R.O.A.'s corporate offices at the appointed time, Webb 
was again refused access. These facts are undisputed by 
Respondents. It is difficult to imagine a situation in which a 
shareholder's requests were more reasonable than those in the 
present case. Contrary to Respondents' assertion that Webb "made 
no effort to arrange a mutually convenient time to conduct the 
investigation,11 Webb made every effort to accommodate 
Respondents' needs even though he was not required to do so under 
the statute. See Respondents' Brief at 5. 
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Respondents have cited no specific facts which would show 
that the inspections would in anyway interfere with R.O.A.'s 
operations. Respondents have not and cannot cite to any evidence 
in the record supporting their conclusion that "the record clearly 
indicates that the defendants tried to assist the plaintiff in his 
attempt to review the books and records of R.O.A." Respondents' 
Brief at 25. 
Respondents argue that it is permissible to limit the scope 
of inspection to avoid abuse. As an example of a case in which 
the court "severely limited" inspection, Respondents cite 
Schwartzman v. Schwartzman Packing Co.. 99 N.M. 436, 659 P.2d 888 
(1983). There the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in limiting inspection to 
"regular business hours in addition to the 222 hours examination 
which had previously been allowed." Webb would be happy to have 
his inspection so restricted. 
The material facts in this case showing adequate notice, lack 
of inconvenience to R.O.A. and reasonable purpose are all 
undisputed. Webb's request to verify the accuracy of R.O.A.'s 
books is, as a matter of Law, a proper purpose. Business hours 
are, as a matter of law, a reasonable time for inspection. 
Clawson v. Clayton, 33 Utah 266, 93 P. 729 (1908). Both parties 
have made identical statements regarding the dates and the actions 
taken. Although Respondents have alleged an improper motive on 
Webb's part, they have shown no specific evidence whatsoever to 
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support that allegation. To remand these facts to the trial court 
would only add unnecessary expense and delay to both parties. 
POINT V. 
WEBB IS ENTITLED TO THE AWARD OF THREE 
STATUTORY PENALTIES AND ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
The penalty provisions of the statute must serve as a viable 
deterrent to corporations and their officers. To permit violating 
parties to escape with a single penalty regardless of how many 
times and for how long they refuse to permit inspection 
effectively allows the corporation to purchase multiple and serial 
exemptions from the law for a one-time fee. In the case of 
minority shareholders, a single 10% penalty would normally be a 
very small price to pay to silence opposition. 
Meyer v. Ford Industries. Inc.. 272 Or. 531, 538 P.2d 353 
(1975), cited by both Webb and Respondents, authorizes multiple 
penalties for multiple refusals. This conclusion does not require 
a liberal interpretation of the statute, only a literal one. The 
well-known principle asserted by Respondents, that penal statutes 
should be strictly interpreted, applies only when the statute is 
subject to different reasonable interpretations. Given the 
undisputed fact that three separate refusals occurred, the statute 
demands that three separate penalties be imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The literal application of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-47(b) and 
the authorities cited by Webb in his original brief, all of which 
are directly on point, compel the conclusion that the District 
Court erred in ruling that Webb's status and rights as a 
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shareholder were extinguished by R.O.A.'s mere giving notice of 
exercise of option to purchase his stock. Respondents have failed 
to cite any cases on point in support of their argument to the 
contrary. The general contract principles relied upon by 
Respondents in their brief are patently misapplied in this case. 
Webb respectfully requests the Utah Supreme Court to reverse 
the District Court's order and to enter an order directing the 
District Court to grant Webb's motion for partial summary judgment 
(i) issuing an injunction pursuant to Rule 65A(a) and (e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requiring R.O.A. to make its books 
and records available to Webb for shareholder examination; (ii) 
imposing the statutory penalties in amounts to be determined at 
trial for each past refusal to allow such examination; and (iii) 
granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem 
necessary and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this / P day of March, 1988. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
By: 
Val J. Christensen, Esq. 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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